Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control by Kittle, Simon
 Journal of Analytic Theology, Vol. 3, May 2015 
10.12978/jat.2015-3.180813100804 
©2015 Simon Kittle • © 2015 Journal of Analytic Theology 
Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control 
 
Simon Kittle 
University of Sheffield 
 
 
Abstract: Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based 
solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate 
grace and free will.  By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject 
Timpe’s account – itself an extension of Stump’s account – to extended 
critique.  I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe’s solution, his reliance on 
Dowe’s notion of quasi-causation, is of no help in addressing the problem.  As 
a result, Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism.  I canvass two 
alternatives, each of which adheres to the broad theological assumptions 
made by Stump and Timpe.  I conclude that both proposals fail, although I 






There is a long standing problem in Christian theology which can be 
generated with two thoughts central to Christian thinking.  The first is that people 
are responsible for failing to come to faith in Christ and the second is that saving 
faith is entirely a gift from God, a gift that is not earned nor given based on any 
merit.  If one accepts the view that responsibility requires free will, then the first 
claim implies that the person is to some degree active in coming to faith – it is 
something that the person does, and does freely.  The second claim was originally 
made against the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians.1  Roughly, the Pelagians denied that 
the Fall damaged the moral capacities of humans and affirmed that post-Fall 
humans had the power to do all that was required of them by God’s commandments 
(including turning to God).  The Semi-Pelagians denied this, but they did insist that 
fallen humans could at least begin or try to seek after God.  The second claim is the 
denial of these ideas: it affirms that God is the sole actor in the process of a human 
coming to faith.  This implies that the person is passive in a way which is in tension 
with the first claim.  Eleonore Stump has recently presented a Thomistic solution to 
this traditional theological problem.  Her account has been criticised by Kevin 
Timpe, who has suggested how the account might be extended to meet the problem.  
Here I argue that Timpe’s account is unsuccessful in avoiding Semi-Pelagianism.  I 
canvass two possible ways forward, suggesting that one fails outright and the other 
has partial success if one understands the condemnations of the (Semi-)Pelagians in 
                                                             
1 For some useful background see Pohle (1917a; 1917b). 
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2. Stump’s solution and its flaw 
 
Stump has recently claimed that Aquinas’s theory of the human will provides 
a way to reconcile the two claims outlined above (Stump 2003, 389–404).  The key 
is to recognise that the human will has not just two “positions” but three: with 
respect to some issue, the human will can assent to it, reject it, or be in a state of 
quiescence.  In this latter state the will is neutral with respect to the issue at hand – 
it is simply “turned off” (Stump 2003, 394).  This promises a solution along the 
following lines: God is constantly offering grace to everyone (Stump 2007, 103).  
The default state of normal, post-Fall human beings is to resist this offer; moreover, 
such post-Fall humans are unable to accept it.  However, people in this state can 
become quiescent with respect to God’s offer of grace.  That is, they can move to a 
state of neither accepting God’s grace nor rejecting God’s grace.  Once the person is 
in this state of quiescence, God infuses grace into that person.  This infusion of grace 
reconfigures the person’s will and enables her to assent to loving God.  But the 
assent only comes after God has operated on the agent’s will.   
According to Stump’s Thomistic account of the will there are a number of 
ways that an agent might become quiescent with respect to some issue.  The one 
that is relevant to the issue of grace and free will, however, concerns the agent’s 
intellect.  An agent moves to a state of quiescence with respect to some issue when 
there is a conflict in her intellect on that issue such that the agent is unable to form a 
“single, integrated judgement about it” (Stump 2003, 399).  Being unable to form a 
judgement about what is best with respect to the topic at issue, the person is said to 
abstain from judgement.  The result is a state of quiescence: the agent neither 
affirms the thing nor rejects the thing. 
On this account nothing external to the agent causes the state of quiescence: 
the quiescence is due ultimately to the operation of the person’s intellect and this, 
Stump argues, secures the person’s control over, and responsibility for, whether or 
not she fails to come to faith (Stump 2003, 401).  However, the process of becoming 
quiescent is not something the agent does – it is not an action.  After all, to stop 
doing something (e.g. resisting grace) need not mean the performance of some 
further action (e.g. accepting grace) (Stump 2003, 402).  The agent who stops 
resisting grace is simply doing nothing, i.e., she is in a state of quiescence.  Moreover, 
Stump concludes that because the state of quiescence is not a positive state but a 
lack – the agent’s will, having ceased resisting God, isn’t doing anything else (like 
accepting God) instead – the person still does not possess a good will.  This means 
that the person neither performs a good action nor possesses a good will and so the 
account avoids both Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism.   
C. P. Ragland (2006) and Timpe (2007) have both raised a problem for 
Stump’s account, namely, that her account does not secure for the human person 
enough control over the process of becoming quiescent and, ultimately, over her 
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coming to saving faith.  On the Thomistic view that Stump endorses, “whether the 
will is turned off or not is always in the power of the will itself” (Stump 2003, 394).  
Despite this, however, Stump says that the process of becoming quiescent is not 
itself an action.  As mentioned above, a person becomes quiescent when her intellect 
enters a state of conflict which it cannot resolve – the intellect cannot produce a 
“single, integrated judgement” about what is best.  This indecision in the intellect 
produces inactivity in the will (Stump 2003, 399). 
On this account it is true that the ultimate source of the agent’s quiescence is 
in the agent herself.  This can be so because we can suppose that the operations of 
the intellect and will are indeterministic, such that the resulting state of quiescence 
cannot trace its origin back to something external to the agent.  It is indeed the case 
then, as Stump says, that only the agent’s “own intellect and will that determine 
which position her will is in” (Stump 2003, 402).  The problem is that this is not 
enough for control.  Ragland puts the worry like this (2006, §5): 
 
To avoid slipping into Semi-Pelagianism, Stump is forced to represent 
humans as altogether too passive with respect to whether they become 
quiescent: quiescence is not a state that they actively choose, but is rather a 
kind of paralysis of intellect and will that befalls humans. 
 
Many states of an agent, including psychological states, might be indeterministically 
caused by other states or events internal to the agent, and yet not under the agent’s 
control.  Ragland gives the example of an evil thought that pops into one’s mind 
unbidden: “we have control over whether or not to consent to such a thought or to 
dwell on it, and we might have control over its recurrence ... but we don’t have 
control over the initial occurrence of the thought” (2006, §5).  That is so even if the 
occurrence of the evil thought is not deterministically caused, and traceable only to 
states or events internal to the agent.  Examples are not limited to moral contexts.  
Emotional or physical events or states internal to the agent might cause in the agent 
a further event or state over which the agent has no control: an involuntary twitch 
in a person’s muscle might cause her to shuffle in her seat, a general feeling of fear 
might result in a person walking home more quickly, and so on.  The point is that 
although the ultimate source of the agent’s quiescence is internal to the agent, this 
does nothing to produce control over the event or state.  And this point seems 
decisive.  While it’s plausible to think this kind of sourcehood is a necessary 
condition on something’s being under the agent’s control, it is not a sufficient 
condition.  The very thing, then, that Stump rules out in order to avoid (Semi-
)Pelagianism – there being a prior act of will – undermines her claim that the agent 
has the right kind of control which is capable of securing her responsibility.   
 
 
3. Timpe’s proposed solution 
 
Timpe thinks that Stump’s account can be augmented so as to address the 
worry just outlined.  What we need, he says, is “an account ... which can maintain 
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both that grace is the sole non-instrumental eﬃcient cause of saving faith and that 
human agents control whether or not they come to saving faith” (Timpe 2007, 289).  
In addressing the problem Timpe outlines a constraint which he thinks any account 
aiming to stick to traditional orthodoxy should aim to satisfy: 
 
(Anti-Pelagian Constraint) No fallen human individual is able to cause or 
will any good, including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a 
unique grace (Timpe 2007, 285). 
 
Timpe employs a strong reading of the Anti-Pelagian Constraint which precludes the 
agent being a cause (as opposed to the sole cause) of her coming to saving faith.  
According to Timpe, if this constraint can be satisfied we will have an account which 
is neither Pelagian nor Semi-Pelagian. 
To provide this account Timpe takes a closer look at the state of quiescence.  
He thinks that Stump is on the right lines when she notes that an agent’s state of 
quiescence is not a positive thing – it is rather an absence or omission.  Indeed, 
Timpe argues that this provides the key to the solution because (on at least some 
dominant theories) omissions cannot be causes.  This means quiescence so 
conceived would not count as a cause.  But because, on these same accounts, 
omissions can enter into causal explanations they might nevertheless be able to 
ground the agent’s control over (and so responsibility for) her lack of faith. 
To develop this idea Timpe appeals to Dowe’s account of “causation” of and 
by omissions.  Dowe accepts the view that omissions, because they are absences, are 
not genuine causes.  But they can be cited in causal explanations, and because of this 
we can treat them as “quasi-causes” (2001, 217).  Dowe’s account has two parts: 
first, quasi-causation by an omission (2001, 222): 
 
(Quasi-causation by omission) An omission (not-A) is the quasi-cause of some 
event B if B occurred and A did not, and there occurred an x such that 
(O1) x caused B, and  
(O1) had A occurred, then A would have prevented B from occurring by 
interacting with x. 
 
Second, the quasi-causation of omissions, otherwise known as prevention (Dowe 
2001, 221): 
 
(Quasi-causation of omissions) A quasi-caused not-B if A occurred and B did 
not, and there occurred an x such that  
(P1) there is a causal interaction between A and the process due to x, and  
(P2) if A had not occurred, x would have caused B. 
 
How does this help with the issue of control?  Timpe’s idea is that being able to 
quasi-cause an omission bestows on the agent control over that omission.  This idea 
is motivated by the following kind of example (which comes from Dowe): suppose 
that a child is about to run out into the street and his father grabs him just at the last 
minute.  The father’s grabbing the child prevented an accident.  In terms of the 
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accounts above: the father’s grabbing the child quasi-caused the lack of an accident 
because there was a process x – the child’s running about – which the father 
interfered with, and which was such that had the father not interfered with it, the 
process would have caused an accident.  Thus, the father has control over whether 
or not there was an accident even though, if there had been an accident, the father 
would not have caused the accident.   
Timpe thus suggests the following view of control (Timpe 2007, 292): 
 
An agent controls an event e when either 
(1) an action of the agent causes e to occur, or  
(2) an omission by that agent quasi-causes e to occur. 
 
Timpe thinks that this allows us to develop an account according to which only 
God’s grace is causally efficacious but which puts the individual in control of 
whether or not they come to saving faith.  His account has two components.  First, 
individuals quasi-cause their being quiescent with respect to God’s offer of grace by 
an act of will (i.e. we first have an instance of the quasi-causing of an omission).  This 
positive act of will quasi-causes (as opposed to causes) the agent’s quiescence 
because quiescence is an omission.  The act of will interferes with a process – the 
agent’s natural disposition to resist God – which is such that had it not been 
interfered with, it would have produced the state of resisting God.  Thus we can say 
that the act of will quasi-causes the lack of the will’s resisting God, or in other words, 
the agent’s state of quiescence.  It is the positing of this act of will which clearly 
distinguishes Timpe’s account from Stump’s: Stump wanted to avoid positing an act 
of will because she thought it would mean that the agent could take credit for their 
coming to saving faith.  Timpe thinks this can be avoided once we recognise the role 
that quasi-causation is playing here.2   
The second step of his account is the quasi-causing of the act of saving faith 
by the individual’s state of quiescence.  Here we have a case of quasi-causation (as 
opposed to causation), not because an omission is being produced, but because the 
omission is leading to something (so Timpe’s second step involves quasi-causation 
by an omission).  The state of quiescence quasi-causes the agent’s coming to saving 
faith because there was a process – God’s acting on (reconfiguring of) the will of the 
agent – which resulted in the agent’s saving faith, but which was such that, had the 
agent not been quiescent, the process would not have succeeded.  The two instances 
of quasi-causation mean that the agent has control over whether or not she comes 
                                                             
2 Given the centrality of this act of will to Timpe’s account it is natural to ask what the content of this 
act of will is.  Timpe characterises it only as “an act of will through which [the agent] becomes 
quiescent” (Timpe 2007, 294).  There are serious questions to be asked about whether such an act of 
will is possible.  After all, we cannot simply will ourselves to be in any state we wish.  If I'm anxious 
about an upcoming event, it's unlikely that I can simply will myself into a state of contentment.  If I'm 
sitting in front of a blue car I cannot simply will myself to see a red car; I could decide to bring it 
about that I see a red car, but that would involve more than willing - it would involve getting up and 
searching for such a car.  There is then a very real threat looming for Timpe's account.  I will not push 
this threat, however, and will grant that there is such an act of will Timpe may appeal to. 
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to saving faith.  Even so, on this account it is God alone who is causally efficacious in 
the individual’s coming to faith, and this, Timpe thinks, means that his account is in 
no way Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian (Timpe 2007, 293–94).   
 
 
4. Control and agency 
 
4.1 Timpe’s account of control: problems and repairs 
 
In what follows I will argue that Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-
Pelagianism, even though his account may well satisfy his Anti-Pelagian Constraint.  
The following is a brief overview of my argument.  First, I will suggest that Timpe’s 
account of control is inadequate.  It is too broad (on a number of counts), affirming, 
for example, that agents control all kinds of things even when they are asleep.  The 
account is fixable, I will suggest, but once we make the required fixes then it will 
become clear that we have control only when we have an instance of “full-blooded” 
human agency.  That is, Timpe is right to suggest that control can be exercised via 
quasi-causation, but that is only because agency itself can be transmitted via quasi-
causation.  Once we’re clear, however, that we have an instance of agency with 
respect to the person’s coming to saving faith, then it will not be at all clear why we 
should deny that the agent is able to bring about her coming to saving faith. 
This point leads us to a deficiency with Timpe’s Anti-Pelagian Constraint: it 
does not cover the entire range of human agency.  It affirms that the agent cannot 
positively cause something which will lead to her salvation (‘cause’ being used in the 
technical sense in which it stands opposed to quasi-causation), and also that the 
agent cannot positively will his coming to saving faith (‘will’ being used in a 
technical sense where it refers to the active forming of an intention to accept grace 
directly), but it does not preclude the agent’s being able to (intentionally) bring it 
about that she comes to saving faith in a different way, namely, by acting in a way 
which involves quasi-causation. 
The Anti-Pelagian Constraint should, of course, preclude the agent’s being 
able to bring about her salvation however that is done.  Just as it is absurd to think 
that those who condemned (Semi-)Pelagianism meant to exclude the possibility of 
an agent being able to directly will her salvation whilst allowing that an agent might 
be able to bring herself to saving faith by, say, tapping an orange three times whilst 
crouching, so too it is absurd to think that those who condemned (Semi-
)Pelagianism meant to exclude the possibility of the agent positively willing her 
salvation whilst allowing that an agent might be able to bring herself to saving faith 
by an action involving quasi-causation.  I will close this section by addressing 
various objections, some of which were offered by Timpe in response to points 
similar to those I’m raising here. 
To begin, recall Timpe’s account of control: 
 
An agent controls an event e when either 
(1) an action of the agent causes e to occur, or  
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(2) an omission by that agent quasi-causes e to occur. 
 
The first point I want to make is that clause (2) is too broad.  Timpe has adopted 
Dowe’s theory of causation which makes a distinction between causation, which 
applies only to positive events, and quasi-causation, which may involve omissions.  
In Dowe’s theory, an omission is a lack or absence.  The term ‘omission’ implies no 
sense of agency.  Let’s be clear about what this means: right now there is no one in 
my study.  Given this, my lack of being in the study is, according to Timpe, quasi-
causing my study to be at its uninhabited temperature.  Moreover, your absence 
from my study is also quasi-causing it to be at its uninhabited temperature.  Indeed, 
every single person on the planet is quasi-causing my study to be at its uninhabited 
temperature.  Quasi-causation is, to understate the issue, abundant.  Every human 
agent quasi-causes all sorts of things, and not just when awake and active but also 
when asleep.   
It’s plausible to think that, in my case, right now, there might be a sense in 
which I omitted to be in my study; that is, my omission might be an instance of my 
agency.  For example, it might be that I consciously decided to go and sit in the living 
room instead of the study.  If that is the case then I refrained from sitting in my 
study and my omission is imputable to me as something I did.  But this will not be 
plausible for anyone but me.  And we must be clear: even though some omissions 
are instances of agency in this stronger sense, Timpe’s account is not employing this 
stronger sense.  It is employing the notion of a mere lack or absence.  No agency is 
implied.  And for this reason, it should be doubted that quasi-causation suffices for 
control.  While my quasi-causing my study to be at its uninhabited temperature 
might, in the manner just outlined, be something that is imputable to me, that will 
not be plausible for anyone else.  Your quasi-causing my study to be at its 
uninhabited temperature is not an exercise of your agency – you haven’t exercised 
control over the temperature of my study. 
If it isn’t yet obvious that quasi-causation is not sufficient for control, note 
that Timpe’s first clause does involve an instance of agency.  An agent controls an 
event if it is caused by one of the agent’s actions.  So with respect to positive 
causation, Timpe thinks that in order for there to be control, there has to be an 
action, an instance of agency.  We might wonder why there is no symmetry here.  If 
Timpe doesn’t think we need an instance of agency to have control with respect to 
omissions, why does he think we need one when it comes to positive causation?  
Why not say that an agent controls an event whenever she causes it to happen, 
regardless of whether she acts?  After all, if an agent exercises control over the 
temperature of my study in virtue of quasi-causing its uninhabited temperature, 
which would be the case when that person is, say, asleep and on the other side of the 
world, doesn’t someone who is currently asleep in some room, such that she is 
causing (and not just quasi-causing) its temperature to be slightly higher than it 
would otherwise be, exert at least as much control over the room’s temperature?  
Timpe’s account, I take it, is better revised in the other direction: rather than 
diluting clause (1) we should strengthen clause (2).  Not any old instance of quasi-
causation is enough for control; rather, just those cases of quasi-causation where the 
omission counts as a refraining, as a genuine instance of agency.  Anyone who 
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agrees that the person sleeping on the other side of the world is not exercising 
control over the temperature of my study will be led to amend clause (2) in this way.  
If Timpe resists this move, and insists that quasi-causation without agency is enough 
for control, then we need an account of why this kind of “control” deserves the 
name, for ordinarily we do not think one thing’s causing (or quasi-causing) another 
counts as control.  I will assume, then, the clause (2) needs to be revised to focus on 
just those omissions which are instances of agency, although I will not attempt to 
delineate the conditions under which that is so. 
Why would making this revision be problematic for Timpe?  The point 
threatens to undermine the basis for his solution.  Timpe distinguishes two ways 
that an agent might control an event: either by causation or by quasi-causation.  And 
this distinction is central to his solution.  When someone controls something via 
quasi-causation, Timpe thinks that that instance of controlling need not be subject 
to the Anti-Pelagian Constraint.  But why is this?  As we’ve just seen, the agent 
controls something via quasi-causation only when she acts, only when the omission 
is an instance of the person’s agency.  But if that is so, why think instances of agency 
which involve quasi-causation should be excluded from the Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint?  After all, we ordinarily say that agents are able to do the things which 
they can do via quasi-causation.  Moreover, it’s clear that agents can bear 
responsibility both for acting in a way which involves quasi-causation and for the 
associated omissions. 
Consider some examples.  I see someone slowly reversing out of a driveway 
who is about to run over his puppy.  Having a strong dislike of dogs, I deliberately 
refrain from signalling the driver, who subsequently runs over the puppy.  
According to Dowe I quasi-cause the puppy’s death for there was a process – the 
driver’s slowly reversing his car – which eventually caused the puppy’s death and 
which was such that, had I interrupted it by signalling the driver, would not have 
done so.  I deserve (at least some) blame both for not signalling the driver and for 
the puppy’s death, and this is so even though I “only” quasi-caused the puppy’s 
death.  Note that on Dowe’s theory you too quasi-caused the puppy’s death because 
you too omitted to signal the driver.  Indeed, everyone quasi-caused the puppy’s 
death.  Yet you are not responsible for your omission nor the puppy’s death: they 
are not imputable to you, because your omission was not an instance of agency in 
the way my omission was.  Still, despite my agency involving quasi-causation, the 
result is imputable to me and I bear responsibility for it.  This provides an example 
of an agent being blameworthy for the quasi-causing of an event by an omission. 
People can also be praiseworthy for quasi-causing something by an omission: 
suppose that Jim is holding forth on some topic and utters some untruth; Kim knows 
this, but recognising that little harm will come of it, refrains from pointing out his 
error, thus saving Jim much embarrassment.  Kim’s omission – her not saying 
anything – quasi-causes Jim’s lack of embarrassment.  And Kim is praiseworthy both 
for her omitting to say anything and for Jim’s lack of embarrassment.   
Similar things apply to the quasi-causation of omissions.  We’ve already 
encountered Dowe’s example of the father who, in grabbing his child before the 
child runs into the road, prevents an accident.  The father’s grabbing the child quasi-
causes the lack of an accident because there was a process – the child’s running into 
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the road – which would have caused an accident had the father not grabbed him.  
The father is praiseworthy for his action but also for there not being an accident.  
That is, he’s praiseworthy for there being no accident.  And we can easily imagine a 
situation involving blameworthiness.  Suppose that the child is running about as 
part of a two-player game of tag.  The father grabs his child, removing him from the 
game, and so quasi-causes the lack of there being any game.  Under the right 
circumstances, the father might be blameworthy for the absence of there being a 
game.  Thus we have examples of an agents being praiseworthy and blameworthy 
for both the quasi-causing of an event by an omission and for the quasi-causing of an 
omission by an event.  In each case we have a “full-blooded” instance of agency; in 
each case the agent bears the same kind of moral responsibility that he or she would 
bear had the action involved only causation. 
But these instances of agency are excluded from Timpe’s Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint which, recall, runs as follows: 
 
(Anti-Pelagian Constraint) No fallen human individual is able to cause or 
will any good, including the will of her coming to saving faith, apart from a 
unique grace. 
 
This constraint says that agents are unable to come to saving faith by causing or 
willing anything good.  The term ‘cause’ here should be read in the technical sense 
that Timpe employs.  And of course, Timpe is free to formulate the constraint using a 
technical sense of the term ‘cause.’  But if he does so, then the question must be 
faced: what justifies the exclusion of those things that people do via quasi-
causation?  After all, it certainly seems as if such people are able to do those things.  
I, for example, was able to bring about the puppy’s death; Kim was able to save Jim 
from embarrassment; the father was able to prevent the accident, and so on.  So the 
ordinary language use of ‘able’ covers things done both via causation and via quasi-
causation.  And as we saw, the agents bore full responsibility for the things they did.  
If, therefore, the intent behind the condemnation of the (Semi-)Pelagians was to say 
that agents were not able to do any salutary work no matter how it was done Timpe’s 
account will be in trouble – not because it fails to satisfy the Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint but rather because the Anti-Pelagian Constraint isn’t what needs to be 
satisfied.  And there is good reason for thinking this is what they did intend.  
Consider canon 4 from the 418 A. D. Council of Carthage (the first major council to 
condemn Pelagianism): 
 
Whoever shall say that the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord helps 
us only in not sinning by revealing to us and opening to our understanding 
the commandments, so that we may know what to seek, what we ought to 
avoid, and also that we should love to do so, but that through it we are not 
helped so that we are able to do what we know we should do, let him be 
anathema (Schaff, 497–98). 
 
This canon discusses what we are able (or rather, unable) to do and appears to be 
precluding the ability to do those things that we should do.  We’ve already seen that 
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ordinary language allows use of ‘able’ when referring to things we do which involve 
omissions.  Note too that this canon explicitly mentions things we ought to avoid – 
things which on Timpe’s account will necessarily involve quasi-causation.  If God’s 
grace is needed to avoid those things we should avoid, then the Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint should cover instances of agency involving quasi-causation.  Similarly, 
canons 6 and 7 of the Second Synod of Orange (the major pronouncement 
condemning Semi-Pelagianism) say: 
 
(Canon 6) If anyone says that God has mercy upon us when, apart from his 
grace, we believe, will, desire, strive, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, or 
knock, but does not confess that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the 
Holy Spirit within us that we have the faith, the will, or the strength to do all 
these things as we ought … he contradicts the Apostle. 
 
(Canon 7) If anyone affirms that we can form any right opinion or make any 
right choice which relates to the salvation of eternal life … or that we can be 
saved, that is, assent to the preaching of the gospel through our natural 
powers without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit … he is led 
astray by a heretical spirit. 
 
Again the thought is that human agents cannot do any salutary work apart from a 
special gift of grace from God.  But it’s not as if the pronouncements say “you cannot 
will the good by causing such a volition in yourself, although you may bring it about 
that you come to saving faith by quasi-causing in yourself a state of quiescence.”  
Nothing is being said about the different kinds of human action – rather, a blanket 
denial is being made.  In other words, it is irrelevant to the pronouncements of the 
councils what the correct metaphysics and causal structure of human action is: if 
such a metaphysics involves quasi-causation, then quasi-causation is precluded.   
This point can be brought home by highlighting that quasi-causation is not 
implicated in only those instances of agency which obviously involve omissions, and 
which we typically describe negatively.  As Schaffer has pointed out, because of the 
way our muscles work – they contract when two components of muscle cells bind 
together, which by default is inhibited from happening, but which does happen when 
an electrical impulse from the nervous system quasi-causes a lack of the relevant 
inhibitor – most if not all human action involves quasi-causation (Schaffer 2012, 
407).  Certainly, when we “strive, labor, pray, study, seek, ask or knock,” we act in 
ways which involve quasi-causation. 
The basic problem, then, is that the Anti-Pelagian Constraint doesn’t exclude 
enough because it doesn’t exclude from the range of things fallen agents can do 
those omissions which count as instances of agency.  There are two ways to press 
this point.  First, quasi-causation appears to be implicated in many human actions 
that are usually described in positive terms and which would therefore be excluded 
by the Anti-Pelagian Constraint.  But if the Anti-Pelagian Constraint is already 
excluding some actions which involve quasi-causation, the exclusion of other actions 
involving quasi-causation appears unmotivated.  Second, as I’ve suggested above, 
it’s clear that many omissions are “full-blooded” instances of human agency.  They 
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are things that are imputable to the agent, and things for which the agent is 
responsible.  There is therefore every reason to think that if an agent comes to 
saving faith via becoming quiescent, her coming to saving faith should, to at least 
some degree, be attributable to her.  And to the degree that she was involved in 
bringing it about, she will be praiseworthy. 
 
 
4.2. Objections and replies 
 
What might Timpe say in response to the above?  Timpe envisages and 
addresses a number of complaints that are similar to the issues raised above, and it 
will be instructive to consider them now.  His most pertinent set of responses comes 
in reply to the following objection: 
 
Suppose that what is most important about the [Anti-Pelagian Constraint] ... 
is that the agent not be able to take credit for her own salvation.  ... But agents 
can be praised and blamed for the omissions when brought about by their 
own acts of will, whether or not one wants to bring such cases under the 
rubric of quasi-causation.  So it’s not clear, even if [the Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint] is ‘technically’ satisﬁed, ... that it isn’t violated in a more 
important sense (Timpe 2007, n. 49). 
 
Timpe’s discussion of this point is brief, the objection and his response appearing 
only in a footnote, but we may extract three claims that might be designed to 
address the issue (Timpe 2007, n. 49): 
 
(a) “One doesn’t deserve credit for one’s becoming quiescent precisely because 
quiescence isn’t a positive or good act of the will – it is instead a lack of an act 
of will.” 
(b) The prior act of will to become quiescent is distinct from willing to accept 
grace. 
(c) While willing to accept grace is a good act and something for which the agent 
would deserve credit, willing to become quiescent is not a good act.  It is a 
better act than willing to resist grace, but being better does not make it good.  
Thus, willing to become quiescent is not something for which the agent can 
take credit. 
 
Consider point (a).  I take it that Timpe intends the phrase ‘one’s becoming 
quiescent’ to refer to the action – the prior act of will – which leads to the agent’s 
state of quiescence.  Reading the phrase like this – as opposed to reading it as 
referring to the resulting state – is supported by Timpe’s treatment of the agent’s 
responsibility for the resultant state later on in the footnote (extracted here as point 
(c)).  So the idea is that the agent doesn’t bear responsibility for this action 
“precisely because quiescence isn’t a positive or good act of the will – it is instead a 
lack of an act of will.” 
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Is Timpe’s emphasis here on quiescence not being a good act of will, or is the 
emphasis on the fact that quiescence is a lack?  The two are to some degree related: 
quiescence cannot be a good act of will if it is no act of will at all.  Timpe is right 
about that much.  Suppose the focus is on quiescence not being a good act of will – 
doesn’t that mean that the agent deserves no credit here, for surely “one cannot 
deserve credit for X if X is not a morally good action”?3  The principle that a person 
cannot deserve credit for X if X is not a morally good action may be challenged if 
‘good’ here is understood as a matter of value – moral goodness or badness – as 
opposed to moral rightness or wrongness.  To anticipate something that I will 
elaborate on below, plausibly, the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on 
the range of options available.  If an agent has two options available, neither of 
which has much value (i.e. neither of which is morally good), still the agent might do 
the right thing – and so deserve credit – if she brings about the better of the two.  
The crucial point for present purposes is that the action Timpe’s opponent is 
pointing to here is not the agent’s quiescence (which isn’t even an action) but the 
agent’s becoming quiescent.  And the latter may be an action for which the agent 
deserves moral praise even if the resulting state is not intrinsically good. 
Perhaps, then, Timpe’s focus is on the fact that quiescence is a lack or 
absence.  It’s not entirely clear how this thought is to be developed.  One possibility 
is that in order to be responsible for an action which is essentially characterised in 
terms of an absence, one would have to think that there is such an absence.  That is, 
one would have to reify the absence.  This, it might be thought, is too high a 
metaphysical price to pay. 
Not only are we not given any reason for thinking this (or even any reason 
for thinking this is what Timpe has in mind), the position is implausible.  We can 
make sense of the agent’s responsibility for her act of will and her responsibility for 
her quiescence (an absence) without reifying absences.  Her act of will to become 
quiescent is an action that cannot be understood apart from the lack of a certain 
state, but this can be explained in terms of states of affairs: what the agent intends to 
do is bring about a certain state of affairs, one characterisable only negatively.  
Moreover, we can say, without reifying absences, that the agent is responsible for 
the fact that she is quiescent.  So it is unproblematic to think of the agent as 
responsible for the action by which she becomes quiescent and for the resulting 
state of quiescence.   
There is nothing unusual or mysterious about this.  When I forget to water a 
neighbour’s plant I’m responsible, not for some strange negative entity, but rather 
for the fact that the plant died.  If I promise to get milk on the way home but forget 
I’m responsible for the subsequent lack of any milk in my kitchen.  This doesn’t 
require that there be a strange ‘non-milk’ object in my kitchen.  I’m simply 
responsible for the fact that there is no milk in my kitchen.  The father who grabs his 
child in time is responsible for the fact that there was no accident.  Similarly, when 
the agent wills to become quiescent she is responsible for the fact that she is now in 
a state of quiescence.  So this first reply fails to gain any traction. 
                                                             
3 I thank an anonymous referee for pushing this point. 
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Now consider point (b).  Timpe argues that the act of will to become 
quiescent is distinct from the willing to accept grace.  Timpe needs to affirm this in 
order to avoid having to say that the agent’s willing to become quiescent is good.  If 
willing to become quiescent just is willing to accept grace, then it would be hard to 
deny that the former is good because the latter is clearly a good act. 
With respect to this point, it is important to be clear about what we’re 
referring to.  I take it that as used by Timpe, the act of will is understood as 
something like the agent’s active forming of a first-order volition with the content 
that I become quiescent (or something similar).  Likewise, the agent’s act of will to 
accept God’s grace is to be thought of as the agent’s active forming of a first-order 
volition with the content that I accept God’s grace (this latter is, of course, something 
the agent cannot do).  Conceived of like so, Timpe’s point is straightforward: the two 
actions are distinct. 
But that is not the end of the story, for human agents are able to – indeed, 
they often have to – do one thing by doing another thing.  This opens up the 
possibility that the agent might bring it about that she accepts grace by willing to 
become quiescent.  Consider the following example which I think makes the point 
easier to grasp: 
 
(Arm raising) My right arm is attached to a hoist which is capable of lifting it 
up.  The hoist is mechanically operated by a handle which I can turn with my 
left hand.  I know how to use the hoist. 
 
Given this setup there are two ways I can raise my right arm.  I can raise it in the 
normal way or I can raise it by turning the handle of the hoist.  When I raise my 
hand in the normal way I form a first-order intention to raise my hand in an 
unmediated way: I will that I raise my arm (“directly”).  This corresponds to the 
person’s actively forming a first-order volition to accept God’s offer of grace.  But 
there is a second way I can raise my arm: I can use the hoist.  Now suppose I’m 
operating the machine and someone comes in and asks me what I’m doing.  I could 
say, ‘I’m hoisting my arm up,’ but I could also say (equally correctly) ‘I’m raising my 
arm’ and ‘I’m bringing it about that my arm is raised.’ 
Now the Arm raising story is not quite parallel to the process of coming to 
faith as envisaged by Timpe because in Arm raising I have both routes available to 
me: I can raise my arm in the normal way, or I can use the hoist.  Suppose, however, 
that my right arm is paralysed.  I cannot raise my right arm “in the normal way.”  We 
could suppose too that I have some strange phobia that precludes me from even 
willing to raise my right arm: that is, I cannot actively form a first-order intention 
with the content that I raise my right arm (in the unmediated way).  Still, I can raise 
my arm.  I can do it using the non-standard method of hoisting it up by operating the 
machine with my left arm.  And in that case, all the statements above are still true of 
me: I’m raising my arm, I’m bringing it about that I raise my arm, I’m intending to 
raise my arm, and I’m willing that I raise my arm.4 
                                                             
4 Leigh Vicens has suggested that this example would not carry as much force if the machine were 
replaced by a person.  For example, suppose that instead of pushing a button I had to ask a person to 
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Similar things are true of the person who cannot actively form a first-order 
volition to accept God’s grace.  If that person knows that were she to become 
quiescent God would infuse grace into her and she would come to saving faith, then 
she has a means by which she can bring it about that she comes to saving faith.  So 
when she wills to become quiescent, she also brings it about that she acquires 
saving faith. 
Finally we come to (c).  Timpe argues that the agent does not deserve any 
credit for willing to become quiescent because, although willing to be quiescent is 
better than willing to resisting God, it is still not good.  Better does not make good.  
Thus, he is under no pressure to concede that the agent deserves any credit on the 
basis that she willed to be quiescent.  Timpe offers an analogy to support this idea: 
 
Suppose that Joe has the opportunity to steal $100 from his boss, but steals 
instead only $20.  Joe’s action here is better than it could have been, but this 
does not mean that Joe deserves any sort of moral credit for the action that he 
did do. 
 
I agree that, on the most natural interpretation of this case, Joe does not deserve 
credit for only stealing $20.  But notice a crucial difference: in the Joe story we 
ordinarily assume that Joe has other options available.  We assume that Joe could 
refrain from stealing altogether.  The availability of this options makes the cases 
disanalogous because with respect to coming to saving faith the agent has no other 
options.  We could bring Timpe’s example more into line with the quiescence case 
by attempting to remove the possibility of the agent’s refraining altogether from 
stealing.  Suppose, for example, that Joe is subject to the following threat: if he does 
not steal from his boss, his whole extended family and all his friends will be killed.  
In addition, let’s say that at one end of his boss’s table lies a crisp twenty dollar bill, 
at the other end lies a one hundred dollar bill.  Joe has an opportunity to steal from 
his boss, but not much of an opportunity: he has time to steal only one of the notes.  
Joe now faces two and only two options.  Refraining from stealing is ruled out by the 
threat, and Joe will satisfy the terms of the threat whichever note he steals.  Both of 
these options still meet Timpe’s criteria, inasmuch as both are (at least intuitively) 
objectively bad states of affairs.  Whichever thing Joe does, there is a sense in which 
we have a bad result: a theft.  Moreover, whichever option Joe picks, there is a sense 
in which his very action will be a morally bad thing.  But moral badness is one thing, 
and moral wrongness is another.  It is plausible in this amended case to think that 
Joe would not be doing anything morally wrong if he stole the twenty dollar bill.  Joe 
would be making the best of a bad situation.  And in doing that he is doing what he 
should be doing, namely, choosing the least bad option.  Thus we can say that Joe 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
raise my arm for me – it doesn’t seem right to say here that I raise my arm.  If our intuitions are 
different here I suggest it’s because (a) it’s hard to imagine an agent ever having another person 
around as a reliable arm-raiser and (b) the suggested revision was in terms of a question: I am to ask 
the helper to raise my arm, which implies that my helper might not comply.  Consider, instead, the 
orders given by a CEO or Field marshal; in issuing commands to their subordinates, CEOs and Field 
marshals will and intend certain results, and we readily say that they brought them about. 
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does the right thing if he steals only the $20 bill, and if he does the right thing, then 
he is praiseworthy (although perhaps only minimally).5 This doesn’t mean that Joe’s 
action is intrinsically good, but it doesn’t have to mean that in order for the point to 
count against Timpe’s view.   
How it is with Joe is how it is with the person who becomes quiescent: the 
individual has two options, each of which is a bad state of affairs (compared to what 
it could be), but in choosing to become quiescent the agent does the right thing.  Her 
becoming quiescent is attributable to her, and, being the right thing to do, she is 
praiseworthy for it.  I conclude, then, that Timpe’s account, if it secures the agent’s 
control in the way designed, does not avoid Semi-Pelagianism.  In the following 
section I will canvass two possible ways of moving forward. 
 
 
5. Moving forward: two proposals 
 
5.1 Reversing the defaults 
 
I have argued that if we posit a prior act of will we inevitably end up with 
something for which the agent deserves credit.  One way of potentially avoiding this 
problem would be to alter the default state of the agent.  Suppose that instead of 
starting out as resisting God’s offer of grace, post-Fall humans start out as quiescent.  
They start out with their will “turned off” with respect to God’s offer.  Now, because 
God’s offer of grace is effective whenever the human person is quiescent, we cannot 
say that God is constantly offering his grace to everyone.  That would imply that as 
soon as someone is born (or has the capacities required for faith), God’s offer of 
grace will become effective and that person will come to saving faith.  I take it that 
that is not what happens.  So this part of the story needs altering.  Instead, we could 
say that God will indeed offer his grace to each person at some point in their life.  
Moreover, we could suggest that he will do this after they have had some 
opportunity to move to a state of resisting him.  If God’s offer is only ever given after 
the agent has been given that opportunity, then the agent seems to have the 
required control, but at the same time we have not posited any prior act of will.  
Thus we can affirm that God is the only actor in the person’s coming to faith, despite 
the fact that each person retains control over whether or not they come to faith. 
Unfortunately, however, this proposal does not work.  There are at least two 
significant theological objections.  First, it is likely that someone who is motivated to 
provide an account which meets the Anti-Pelagian Constraint will also be motive to 
                                                             
5 It might be objected that this conclusion relies on denying the doctrine of double effect.  Double 
effect, if accepted, shows that someone might bring something about, and be aware of this, but yet 
not be responsible for doing so because she did not intend it.  However, neither the above example 
nor the case of becoming quiescence fits with the doctrine of double effect.  One key feature of the 
doctrine states that the unintended (but known) effect for which the agent is not responsible must 
not be a means to the agent’s end (Mangan 1949, 43).  But in both the case above and in the case of 
the agent who becomes quiescent, the least bad action performed is a means to the end, so double 
effect does not apply. 
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retain a substantial doctrine of original sin.  One worry is that this proposal does not 
secure such a thing.  On the current proposal, the default state for a person is not a 
particularly good one: she does not have a will disposed towards God.  But neither 
does she have a will configured for evil.  This consequence might undermine the 
positive benefits of this account (were it to work). 
Another theological worry concerns fairness and the problem of evil.6  If God 
doesn’t offer each person grace straightaway, but instead has to wait until the agent 
has had the opportunity to move to a state of resistance, then perhaps the 
accumulated effect of years of both performing bad actions (unrelated to coming to 
faith) and being on the receiving end of bad actions might bias an individual in an 
unfair manner.  The idea is that the individual’s remaining quiescent or deciding to 
move to a state of resistance would become too much a function of those aspects of 
a person’s life history which are outside of her control.   
The real problem for this view, however, is that despite initial appearances it 
doesn’t solve the problem it sets out to solve.  I’ve talked of a person needing the 
opportunity to move to a state of resistance.  The idea was that if the person has such 
an opportunity, the person is in control of and responsible for a state of affairs 
which obtains.  There are two complications with this idea.  First, not every sense of 
opportunity would be enough for control.  There is a sense in which, in virtue of 
being a British citizen, Suzy has the opportunity to attend university.  But 
circumstances might be such that Suzy cannot make use of this opportunity: she 
might not have the financial means, for example.  Suzy could possess the one kind of 
opportunity, without yet being in control.  Moreover, it’s not that her control is 
undermined by some other kind of consideration – she lacks control because she 
lacks the right kind of opportunity.  Spelling out the kind of opportunity that is 
required for control is difficult.  But for the reasons considered above, and sticking 
to our current assumptions, it is plausible to think that having the right kind of 
opportunity will involve some kind of awareness of what one’s current state is (i.e. 
quiescence) and that this is something one could change (i.e. one could move to a 
state of resistance).  But then it seems that if the agent properly recognises those 
facts, and still continues in her state of quiescence, she has consented to her state of 
quiescent.  This produces control, but it also re-introduces the prior act of will.  So 




5.2. Control over resistance without control over coming to saving faith 
 
Timpe’s target is to secure the agent’s control over whether or not she comes 
to saving faith (2007, 284,285,289,293).  One way forward might be to investigate 
whether the agent would bear the required responsibility for her failing to come to 
faith if she had control over her resistance and her quiescence but lacked control 
over whether or not she comes to saving faith.   
                                                             
6 I owe this point to Tasia Scrutton. 
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It is certainly possible for an agent to control whether or not she is quiescent 
without being in control of whether she comes to faith.  To see this, let A be the 
proposition that the agent accepts God’s grace, R be the proposition that the agent 
resists God’s grace, and Q be the proposition that the agent is quiescent.  Now it 
might be thought that the agent could control Q without controlling A because Q and 
A are contraries (not contradictories): both might be false.  This point does play 
some role but in fact things are more complicated, because it is even possible to 
control P and yet not control ~P.  Suppose, for example, that Kate is control of a light 
switch which is connected in parallel to one other switch, and that both switches are 
connected in series to a light and power source.  Let P be the proposition that the 
light is on.  And suppose that the second switch is connected to a randomiser device.  
Then Kate controls P but she does not control ~P.7  At most, she controls whether 
there is a possibility of ~P.  So control over P can come apart from control over ~P.  
But note that Kate has this control because she has options: she can turn her switch 
on or she can turn it off.  This doesn’t translate into the light’s being on or off, but it’s 
plausible to think that Kate’s control over P requires her to have those options 
available to her. 
What does this show?  It suggests that an agent could control R even if she 
isn’t able to bring about A, as long as she can bring about Q.  That is, if the agent is in 
control of whether she resists God or whether she is quiescent, then whatever she 
does will be imputable to her and so she will be responsible for the state she realises 
in herself.  The person’s responsibility for failing to come to faith would be grounded 
in her ability to realise in herself a state of quiescence.  We would have to insist that 
the person does not know her becoming quiescent would lead to her coming to faith, 
because if we add this knowledge then it seems to “automatically” produce in the 
agent the ability to come to saving faith (indirectly). 
The most significant problem this idea faces is connected to the problem 
which I raised above for Timpe’s account, namely, that the agent’s becoming 
quiescent is the morally right action to perform.  This remains the case even if we 
remove any possibility of the agent having control over her coming to saving faith 
(by removing the agent’s knowledge that her becoming quiescent will lead to her 
saving faith).  Moreover, this remains the case even if we accept that the agent’s 
state of quiescence is an objectively bad state of affairs.  The agent has two options: 
if she chooses the least bad option then she has done the right thing.  The agent who 
becomes quiescent has done something for which she is praiseworthy.  There is no 
way around this.  If we deny that the agent has any knowledge of the fact that her 
becoming quiescent will lead to her coming to saving faith, we can deny that the 
latter was under her control and we can deny that she was in any way the agent of 
her coming to saving faith.  So she won’t bear any responsibility for coming to saving 
faith.  The agent is unable to intentionally bring herself to saving faith, although she 
is able to do something which in fact will bring her to saving faith (it’s just that she 
doesn’t know this). 
                                                             
7 Walton (1974) has a useful discussion of a variety of cases of this sort. 
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Is this enough to avoid (Semi-)Pelagianism?  It depends on how we read the 
pronouncements.  Do they mean to affirm that humans are unable to perform any 
action with the intention that it would lead to their saving faith?  Or do they make 
the stronger claim, namely, that humans are unable to perform any action that 
would in fact lead to their saving faith, whether they know it or not?  If the 
pronouncements make the former claim but not the latter claim then the position 
sketched above might escape (Semi-)Pelagianism.  This solution differs from 
Timpe’s in the following way.  First, it has nothing to do with the causation/quasi-
causation distinction.  It is, I suggest, highly implausible that the solution to the 
problem of grace and free will could depend on such a thing, because our ordinary 
ascriptions of agency cut across that distinction.  Second, it relies on explicitly 
disconnecting the agent’s control over her resistance and quiescence on the one 
hand from her control over coming to saving faith on the other.  Third, it requires us 
to employ a weak understanding of the pronouncements of the councils to the effect 
that they preclude the agent performing an action which she knows will lead to her 
salvation.  This last point renders irrelevant the issue of whether the action which 
the agent does perform is morally right or not: we can accept that the agent’s 
becoming quiescent is an action for which the agent is praiseworthy, as long as the 
agent doesn’t conceive of what she is doing intentionally as in any way bringing 
about her saving faith.  She’s praiseworthy for something, just not coming to saving 
faith. 
However, this proposal is not without its own problems.  The weak reading 
of the pronouncements of the councils has some unintuitive results.  Suppose that 
God resolves to bring to saving faith any person who picks up a purple cup at noon 
on the third day after a full moon.  Presumably fallen human beings have the ability 
to pick up purple cups, and so also have the ability to pick up purple cups at noon on 
the 3rd day after a full moon.  On the above account they have that ability, and would 
come to faith were they to exercise it, only as long as they don’t know what results 
from picking up the cup.  What’s puzzling here is that we would have to say that if 
someone came to know that her being saved would follow from her picking up the 
cup would, then she would lose the ability to pick up purple cups at noon on the 
third day of the month.  Letting the acquiring of saving faith depend on a bizarre and 
arbitrary action – the agent’s picking up a purple cup at noon on a certain day – 
allows us to see how strange this is: the addition of knowledge has to somehow 
remove what looks like a predominantly physical ability.  Something similar is true 
in the case of quiescence.  On the above story, fallen humans could choose to become 
quiescent without any problems as long as they were blind to the fact that as a 
result of this they would come to faith.  Any fallen human learning this would, on the 
current account, then lose the ability to become quiescent.  This feature of the 
account is, at the very least, puzzling.  For this reason I want to make clear that I do 
not mean to endorse this model, although it is, I think, the closest we can get to a 
solution while still positing only one unique grace. 
 
 





I have argued that Timpe’s account of an agent’s coming to faith does not 
avoid Semi-Pelagianism.  I have suggested that Timpe’s account of control is 
inadequate, and that fixing it will reveal that there is little basis for excluding those 
things agents do via quasi-causation from the scope of the Anti-Pelagian Constraint.  
Agents can indeed control things via quasi-causation, but that is because omissions 
can be imputable to them as agents, and they can, as a result, bear moral 
responsibility both for acting so as to bring about the omission and the omission 
itself.  Recognising this leaves us with little reason to think that instances of agency 
which involve quasi-causation should be treated any differently from those which 
involve only causation.  If we extend the Anti-Pelagian Constraint to cover such 
instances of agency then Timpe’s account will not satisfy it. 
I canvassed two possible ways forward.  I explored the possibility of 
reversing the defaults such that the agent starts out quiescent but has the 
opportunity to move to a state of resistance.  This introduced two theological 
worries and didn’t, in the end, solve the underlying philosophical problem.  A more 
promising approach limited the agent’s control such that she did not have control 
over her coming to saving faith but did control whether she resisted or was 
quiescent (this required denying that the agent knows her becoming quiescent 
would lead to her coming to faith).  I suggested that this proposal is the closest we 
can get to a solution while positing only one unique grace (other ways forward, not 
discussed here, might involve positing more than one unique grace).  But still 
problems remain.  The person who becomes quiescent does the morally right thing 
and so is praiseworthy for that act.  I suggested that whether or not this constitutes 
a serious objection depends on the particular understanding of the condemnations 
of (Semi-)Pelagianism that we employ.  However, if we employ a reading according 
to which the proposal avoids Semi-Pelagianism, the resulting view has some 
unintuitive consequences concerning the agent’s abilities.  In closing, it seems that 
one grace solutions (two grace solutions, if we count the grace of creation) do not 
fare well when it comes to securing the agent’s responsibility for lack of faith while 
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